Volume 1, Issue 1, September 2017, Page: 35-43
Board Monitoring Intensity and Firm Performance Nexus: The Moderating Effect of Agency Conflict
Agyemang Badu Ebenezer, Department of Business Administration, School of Business and Economics, Presbyterian University College, Abetifi, Ghana
Received: May 9, 2017;       Accepted: Jun. 2, 2017;       Published: Jul. 25, 2017
DOI: 10.11648/j.jppa.20170101.14      View  1396      Downloads  88
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of board monitoring intensity on firm performance and further investigate the moderating effect of agency conflict on the relationship between monitoring intensity and firm performance. This paper uses a panel data of 137 firms listed on stock exchanges in Ghana and Nigeria over a period of seven years. System generalized method of moments and other estimation techniques were adopted for the study. The paper compute agency score using principal factor analysis and examine the moderating effect on the relationship between board composition measures and firm performance. Our findings which are robust across a number of econometric models that deal with different kinds of endogeneities indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship between board monitoring intensity and firm performance. A further examination using the agency score computed from principal factor analysis of the four main agency proxies indicates that agency conflict moderate the relationship between monitoring intensity and firm performance.
Keywords
Monitoring Intensity, Firm Performance, Agency Conflict, Agency Theory
To cite this article
Agyemang Badu Ebenezer, Board Monitoring Intensity and Firm Performance Nexus: The Moderating Effect of Agency Conflict, Journal of Public Policy and Administration. Vol. 1, No. 1, 2017, pp. 35-43. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20170101.14
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Authors retain the copyright of this article.
This article is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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